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NOTES
BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE ORDER:
INJUNCTION

AGAINST

SUBSEQUENT

LIMITED EFFECT OF THE

CREDITOR

ACTION-In

re

Thompson, 416 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
A discharge' in bankruptcy is designed to provide the honest
debtor a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the presence and discouragement of preexisting
debt.' Discharges thereby operate as a safety valve to permit the
3
smooth operation of an economy which depends on credit.
4 to the Bankruptcy
The 1970 Dischargeability Amendments
Act were designed to more fully effectuate the fresh start provided
by the discharge. 5 One of the mechanisms provided by that act is
an injunction against creditor harassment of a discharged bankrupt.
New subdivision f(2) added to section 14 of the Act reads, "An order
of discharge shall . . .(2) enjoin all creditors whose debts are discharged from thereafter instituting or continuing any action or em1. "Discharge" is defined by the Bankruptcy Act as "the release of a bankrupt from
all his debts which are provable in bankruptcy, except such as are excepted by this title." 11
U.S.C. § 1(15) (1970).
2. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
3. "The primary function of the bankruptcy system is to continue the law-based orderliness of the open credit economy in the event of a debtor's inability or unwillingness . . . to
pay. . . . [T]he bankruptcy process provides for the orderly death (or corrective surgery)
of units which succumb to acute indebtedness." A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, chap.
3 (1973) (chapter 3 is titled "A Philosophical Basis for a Federal Bankruptcy Act"), reprinted
in SELECTED BANKRUPTCY STATUTES 338 (West 1974).
A discharge affords benefits to 3 groups. A discharge is humane to debtors and permits
them a fresh start. A discharge aids creditors in discovering and recovering assets by acting
as an inducement to debtors to disclose their assets in order to obtain the discharge of their
debts. A discharge promotes the public interest by not keeping a debtor forever bound to his
debts but restoring him to productive participation in the business community. Ungerman,
Discharge: The Prime Mover in Bankruptcy, 36 REF. J. 85 (1962). Cf. COWAN'S BANKRUPTCY
LAW & PRACTICE § 1 (1963).
For an eloquent argument of the public interest in discharges, see Daniel Webster's
speech of May 18, 1840, quoted in part in Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States: The Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 427, 438-41 (1974).
4. Pub. L. No. 91-467, 84 Stat. 990 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. (1970)).
In order to avoid confusion, section numbers used in the text will be those of the Bankruptcy
Act rather than those of title 11 U.S.C. since that is the way they are commonly cited in the
bankruptcy cases, treatises, and law review articles. Each section will be footnoted to 11
U.S.C. the first time it is mentioned herein. Cross reference tables between the Bankruptcy
Act and 11 U.S.C. are also included in the front of each volume of 11 U.S.C.A. and the first
volume of 11 U.S.C.S.
5. See note 21 infra and accompanying text.
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ploying any process to collect such debts as personal liabilities of the
bankrupt. "I
In a case of first impression of section 14f(2), In re Thompson'
limited the protection afforded by that section to discharged debtors. The creditor of a discharged bankrupt, in order to induce a
reaffirmation of a discharged debt, threatened to bring civil and
criminal actions, and did bring a criminal fraud action against the
bankrupt. Those collection activities oppose the purpose of the discharge to give the debtor a breathing space free from the harassment
of creditors. In a decision which should be of significant interest to
creditors, the court decided that neither type of conduct is a technical violation amounting to contempt of the discharge order.
I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Alleged Violations of the Injunction
Jimmy Thompson filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy in
1972. A bank was listed among his secured creditors and filed a proof
of claim for $4200. Although the bank viewed the debt as induced
by the fraud of the bankrupt, it neither objected to discharge of the
debt under section 148 of the Bankruptcy Act, nor filed an exception
to discharge under section 171 of the Act. The discharge order sent
to the bank contained the injunction required by section 14f(2).
Two months after discharge the bank's attorney wrote twice to
Thompson threatening criminal proceedings for fraud and civil proceedings to collect the debt unless arrangements were made to pay
the debt within 10 days. Thompson did not respond. The bank did
not file a civil action, but it did cause criminal charges to be brought
by the State of Texas. Thompson was acquitted.
Thompson filed a motion in the bankruptcy court asking the
bank and its attorney be held in civil contempt of the order of
discharge. From a ruling for the creditor, Thompson appealed to the
district court.
The District Court's Decision
"The sole question before this court is the scope of the statutory
6. 11 U.S.C. § 32(f)(2) (1970). Bankruptcy Rule 404(f) requires the discharge order to
conform substantially to Official Form No. 24 which incorporates the injunctive language of
this section.
7. 416 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1976). No further appeal has been taken, and the case
is closed according to the Clerk of the District Court.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 32 (1970).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970).
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language contained in [section 14f(2)]."'1 Legislative history is the
primary tool to be used in interpreting statutory language."
The court read congressional intent narrowly to aim only at a
particular kind of postdischarge abuse. The history more than once
cites the problems of creditors suing bankrupts in state courts on
discharged debts, but the Act does not change the enforceability of
a new promise to pay made after the discharge. The court reasoned,
therefore, that it was only a civil action, and not other methods of
encouraging reaffirmation of a debt, that the legislation intended to
enjoin.
The practices of the bank and its attorney were, according to
the court, inexcusable and in obvious disregard of the purposes of
2
the Bankruptcy Act to give the bankrupt a fresh start. But threats
of legal action (as informal collection practices) and the bringing of
a criminal action (as a proceeding by the state) both failed to meet
the court's narrow, technical interpretation of "action" and
"'process."
II.

ANALYSIS

There are three points to be considered in the construction of all
remedial statutes: the old law, the mischief, and the remedy: that is,
how the common law stood at the making of the act; what the mischief was, for which the common law did not provide; and what
remedy the parliament hath provided to cure this mischief. And it is
the act, as to suppress the
the business of the judges so to construe
3
remedy.
the
mischief and advance
Blackstone's framework for statutory interpretation is a logical
and convenient one from which to work. Based on that framework,
this note will start with a look at the prior state of law and the
abuses it spawned, and then proceed to the remedy provided by
Congress. With that background, Thompson's two alleged abuses
can be appropriately examined against the present law.
Old Law and Mischief: Need for the 1970 Dischargeability
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act
Prior to the 1970 Amendments, the general proposition was that
the bankruptcy court merely determined the right to a discharge.
10.
11.
12.

416 F. Supp. at 994.
Id., citing Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
416 F. Supp. at 996.

13.

1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *87.
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Once the discharge was granted, its effect on any particular creditor's claim was determined by the nonbankruptcy court in which
the creditor pressed his claim." 4 The creditor could still bring a suit
in state court to collect a discharged debt. The discharge was an
affirmative defense which was waived if not pled. Consequently, the
creditor could recover by default if the discharged debtor did not
defend. '1
This state of law allowed several abuses of discharged bankrupts by creditors. Creditors took advantage of the ignorance of
many bankrupts of the need to plead the discharge as a defense. 6
Creditors, if they held a cognovit note or falsely verified service of
process, could deprive the debtor of any opportunity to plead his
discharge." 7 Creditors coerced reaffirmation of discharged debts by
those debtors who wanted to avoid the further expense and embarrassment of litigation necessary to assert their rights.18 Against this
background of abuse, the 1970 Dischargeability Amendments, including section 14f(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, were enacted.
The Thompson court's reading of the language of 14f(2) is a
plausible one, and one which is technically correct. There is, however, always more than one correct reading, and the real question
14. Helms v. Holmes, 129 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1942) (only the bankruptcy court is
bound
to take judicial notice of a discharge in bankruptcy); In re Havens, 272 F. 975 (2d Cir.
1921);
In re Bell, 212 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Va. 1962); 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 14.69, at 1453
(14th
ed. 1976); J. MOORE & W. PHILLIPS, DEBTORS' AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 9-43 (4th ed.
1975).
15. Even prior to the 1970 Amendments, however, Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S.
234 (1934) provided an exception to the general proposition. A bankruptcy court, on
application of the bankrupt, could enjoin a creditor from prosecuting his claim in another
court so
as to effect the discharge order. There had to be unusual circumstances making the
debtor's
normal remedy in the state courts unduly burdensome or expensive.
In Local Loan, a creditor brought an action against the bankrupt's employer seeking
to
enforce a $300 prebankruptcy assignment of future wages. The debt on which the assignment
was based had been discharged by the bankruptcy court. Because the suit was in
an Illinois
state court and the Illinois Supreme Court had already held these assignments
valid, the
bankrupt would have had to pursue a long and expensive course of litigation before
reaching
a court whose judgment was not predetermined. That remedy was inadequate, and
so the
bankruptcy court, in order to effectuate the discharge order, enjoined the creditor
from
prosecuting his state court action.
Local Loan had varying results in different jurisdictions depending on the stringency
with which "unusual circumstances" were interpreted. Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 4 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Countryman].
16. See, e.g., In re Casper 338 F. Supp. 327, 330 (E.D. Va. 1972); S. & M. NADLER, THE
LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 805, at 670 (2d ed. 1972).
17. Countryman, supra note 15, at 21, citing HEARINGS BEFORE SUaCOMMITTEE
OF SENATE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ON S. 578, S. 1316, H.R. 2517, H.R. 2518 and H.R.
2519, 90th Cong.,

1st Sess., 24-26, 54-56, 58-60, 64-70, 72-80 (1967).
18. See, e.g., In re Caldwell, 33 F. Supp. 631, 635 (N.D. Ga. 1940), aff'd sub
nom.
Davison-Paxon Co. v. Caldwell, 115 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied 313 U.S. 564
(1941).
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is which of the technically correct readings of a statute should be
given. 9 If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of
some assumed purpose.2 Because legislative history is a primary
means of discovering legislative purpose, an examination of that
history is in order. The Thompson court took that approach.
Scope of the Remedy: The Legislative History and the Intent of
Congress
The first sentence in the legislative history of the 1970 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act states, "[T]he major purpose of the
proposed legislation is to effectuate, more fully, the discharge in
bankruptcy by rendering it less subject to abuse by harassing creditors." 2 ' Although the abuse of debtors by postdischarge suits in state
courts is specifically mentioned, the concern for preventing harassment of consumer bankrupts reads more broadly than that. The
history2 2 points out that "debtors are frequently harassed and
coerced by creditors into paying debts that may have been discharged." 23
The Thompson court, noting that Congress did not alter the
24
enforceability of a new promise to pay a discharged debt, argues
that Congress necessarily upheld the collection practices, especially
threatening letters, which creditors use to extract those new promises to pay.25 That premise can be challenged. The fact that a new
promise to pay is still valid does not mean that Congress intended
to permit any conduct short of a civil suit, or a garnishment or
19. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399 (1950).
20. Id.
, reprinted in [1970] 2 U.S. CODE
21. H.R. REP. No. 91-1502, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. Accord, S. REP. No. 91REPORT].
HOUSE
as
cited
[hereinafter
4156
4156,
CONG. & AD. NEWS
1173, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).
22. A letter, dated September 15, 1970, from Royal E. Jackson, Chief, Division of
Bankruptcy of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, to Byron Rogers, the chairman
of Subcommittee 4 of the House Judiciary Committee, was incorporated in the House Report.
It is reprinted in [19701 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4157-60. The letter argued in favor
of the bill before the subcommittee in order to strengthen the discharge provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act.
23. Id. 4158. Substantially the same remarks were made by Representative Wiggins in
support of the bill. 116 CONG. REc. 34818 (October 5, 1970).
24. Explanatory Memorandum to Accompany S. 4247, 116 CONG. REc. 34818, 34819
(October 5, 1970).
25. 416 F. Supp. at 996.
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attachment writ,26 to be used to coerce the debt's reaffirmation.
Congress could easily have limited the language of section
14f(2) to civil actions if that was their intention. Section 14f(1), 7
passed at the same time, declares that judgments obtained in other
courts on debts discharged by the bankruptcy court are void. If civil
suits were the only concern, that should be enough. The bankrupt
could simply ignore any state court action on a discharged debt
knowing an adverse judgment is of no effect.
But section 14f(2) also adds the injunction broadly prohibiting
"instituting or continuing any action or employing any process" to
collect discharged debts.28 That points to a broader concern not just
for blocking resurrection of the debt by a state court, but for blocking harassment of the bankrupt as well. Section 14g,29 allowing the
registration and enforcement of the discharge order and injunction
in other districts, also points to that concern. Furthermore, the
concern expressed in the legislative history for the hardship and
expense to a bankrupt in retaining legal assistance against a postdischarge action 3 applies with nearly equal 3' force to both civil and
criminal actions.
The legislature is not equipped to anticipate every type of abuse
which might occur. But legislative intent, fairly expressed, should
not be frustrated by a narrow interpretation of the statute for that
reason.3 1 Statements in the legislative history, and the wording of
those provisions of section 14 just mentioned, both express a legislative concern for preventing harassment of a discharged bankrupt to
effectuate his fresh start. The Supreme Court in Local Loan v.
Hunt3 3 also urged that provisions of the Bankruptcy Act be con26. The court, citing IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY
14.69, at 1454-55 (14th ed. 1976),
implies that such writs would be prohibited by the phrase "employing any
process." The
appellee also conceded that writs are prohibited by the injunction. Brief for
Appellee at 4.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 32(f)(1) (1970):
An order of discharge shall (1) declare that any judgment theretofore or thereafter
obtained in any other court is null and void as a determination of the personal
liability
of the bankrupt with respect to any of the following: (a) debts not excepted
from the
discharge under subdivision (a) of section 35 of this title; (b) debts discharged
under
paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of section 35 of this title; and (c) debts determined
to
be discharged under paragraph (3) of subdivision (c) of section 35 of this
title.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 32(f)(2) (1970).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 32(g) (1970).
30. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 4158.
31. There may be a difference if the penalty for the crime charged is a serious
one. The
bankrupt might then be entitled to counsel at state expense. On the other hand,
the hardship
and embarrassment involved in a criminal action exceed those involved in
a civil action.
32. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-MeaningRule" and Statutory
Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299, 1313
(1975). See also
United States v. Smith, 209 F. Supp. 907, 916 (D. Ill. 1962).
33. 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934).
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strued in harmony with the purpose of permitting the bankrupt a
fresh start. The bank creditor's methods ought therefore to be analyzed against this legislative purpose. An examination of the criminal action will be followed by an examination of the threats of legal
action.
The Criminal Action and Conflicting Social Interests
behind
There is a potential conflict between the social interests
3 4-and the
the criminal laws-bringing the wrongdoer to justice
35
bankruptcy laws-redeeming the bankrupt. When the court determines as a matter of fact, however, that the criminal action is
action lacks the
brought in bad faith to collect a debt, then that
6 and the conflict
laws,"
justification of vindication of the state's
fades. In Thompson, the bankruptcy court judge reprimanded the
3
bank's attorney for his conduct and concluded that the use of
a client's position in a civil matter was
criminal process to improve
38
practice.
an unethical
Because of the potential conflict in social interests, it is an
interesting question whether 14f(2) prohibits good faith criminal
39
prosecutions. In re Penny finds that protecting the public interest
behind the criminal laws can be postponed until the public interest
behind the bankruptcy laws is satisfied. Criminal proceedings ought
to be enjoined until the debt is ultimately found to be nondischargeable:
The only way to insure effectuation of the judgments of the bankruptcy court is to enjoin permanently criminal proceedings founded
on this debt against Penny.
Of course, if the debt is ultimately found to be not dischargeable,
no federal purpose would be served by continuing to enjoin the state
34. In Thompson, the bank creditor argued that the action was "a proceeding by the
state of Texas, however the respondents may have participated in it, seeking vindication of
its laws and punishment for conduct deemed criminal." Brief for Appellee at 2.
35. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) states the interest in permitting
the debtor a fresh start has been emphasized again and again to be of public as well as private
interest. See also note 3 supra and Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192.
36. In re Penny, 414 F. Supp. 1113, 1115 (W.D.N.C. 1976).
37. 416 F. Supp. at 994, n.1.
38. 416 F. Supp. at 996.
39. 414 F. Supp. 1113, 1115 (W.D.N.C. 1976). After Penny filed a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy, a creditor swore out a criminal warrant against Penny on a bad check charge.
the
Penny was convicted in a North Carolina court. The federal district court enjoined
jurisdiction
the
frustrated
they
since
thereon
execution
or
proceedings
continuing of criminal
and judgments of the bankruptcy court.
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prosecution, notwithstanding the court's strong opinion that such
proceedings abuse the process of courts. 40
Exclusive jurisdiction over all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy belongs to the federal court." The provisions of sections 14f
and 2a(15) 42 are express grants by Congress of the appropriate jurisdiction to issue injunctions to enforce the Bankruptcy Act.43 One of
the purposes of the 1970 Amendments was to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court to determine both the debtor's right
to discharge and the effect of a discharge once granted." These
federal grants of jurisdiction corroborate the view that the public
interest behind the bankruptcy laws is thought to be substantial
enough to merit postponing a state criminal prosecution. The criminal prosecution can proceed once the creditor has raised the debtor's
conduct in the bankruptcy court to prevent discharge of that debt.
So long as the Bankruptcy Act makes provision to prevent discharge
of a debt created by fraud or other criminal conduct, then the social
interest in bringing a wrongdoer to justice is little damaged by waiting until a determination of nondischargeability can be made.
The Bankruptcy Act does make several provisions, including
the following, for the vindication of the rights of defrauded creditors.
Many of these provisions were revised by the same 1970 Amendments. 45 A creditor may file an objection to discharge of a debt under
section 14b, 41 or apply to except a debt from discharge under section
17c(1).47 If an objecting creditor shows reasonable grounds to believe
that the bankrupt has committed any act which would prevent his
40. Id. (emphasis by the court).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1970): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
exclusive of the courts of the States, of all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy."
42. 11 U.S.C. § li(a)(15) (1970). Note 70 infra.
43. In re Burke, No. BK-1-75-1760 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 22, 1976), 2 BANKR. L. REP.
(CCH)
66,368.
44. Explanatory Memorandum to Accompany S. 4247, 116 CONG. REc. 34818,
34819
(October 5, 1970).
45. Both major discharge sections 14 and 17 were revised. Causes for which a discharge
could be revoked under section 15 were expanded. The House Report recites that
the bill is
"all inclusive in updating the procedural aspects of discharge to protect more
fully the
interests of both classes, bankrupts, and creditors." HousE REPORT, supra note
21, at 4157.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 32(b)(2) (1970) provides in part,
. . . the court shall hear such proofs and pleas as may be made in opposition to the
discharge, by the trustee, creditors, the United States attorney, or such other attorney
as the Attorney General may designate, at such time as will give the bankrupt
and
the objecting parties a reasonable opportunity to be fully heard.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 35(c)(1) (1970): "The bankrupt or any creditor may file an application
with the court for the determination of the dischargeability of any debt."
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discharge, then section 14c4 puts the burden of proving that he has
not committed that act on the bankrupt. When a debtor fails to
appear and submit himself to examination by creditors and the
4
court at bankruptcy proceedings, section 14e says that he is
deemed to have waived his right to discharge. To make sure these
rights are meaningful, section 14b(1) requires notice of the time
limit for filing objections or exceptions,50 and also permits the court
to extend that time. Section 14h 5l assures notice of discharge to
every creditor. Even after discharge is granted, section 1552 permits
the court to revoke a discharge on application of the creditor at any
time within a year after discharge if the discharge is obtained
through fraud of the bankrupt.
These provisions of sections 14, 15, and 17 allow ample opportunity for a creditor to raise fraud. 53 They can be construed in conjunction with section 14f(2) to enjoin creditor remedies other than
those statutorily provided to oppose and subsequently attack discharge of a debt. Courts have previously interpreted different provi54
sions of the Bankruptcy Act in pari materia. When statutory provisions are enacted on the same subject at the same time, they should
be interpreted in conjunction. 5
The Bank's Use of a Criminal Action
Although the creditor bank in the Thompson case received the
required notice and filed a proof of claim, it failed to use any of its
48. 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (1970).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 32(e) (1970).
50. Not less than 30 nor more than 90 days after the first meeting of creditors. 11 U.S.C.
§ 32(b)(1) (1970). Under Bankruptcy Rules 404 and 409 shorter time periods are permitted if
notice is given to the creditors that it appears from the schedules that there are no assets
from which a dividend can be paid.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 32(h) (1970).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 33 (1970). The addition of further grounds for revocation in the 1970
Amendment places a greater responsibility on the bankrupt to submit himself for examination, because his failure to do so may subject him to a revocation of his discharge. S. & M.
NADLER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY, § 809e (2d ed. 1972). Besides the provisions of § 15, In re
McCann, 387 F. Supp. 416 (D. Kan. 1975), recognizes a grant of relief to a creditor from a
14f(2) injunction in proper circumstances.
53. In re Kaid, 347 F. Supp. 540, 543 (E.D. Va. 1972), concludes that statutory provisions among those cited above make it clear that the bankruptcy court is the exclusive forum
for contesting the dischargeability of debts on grounds like conversion and fraud. Those
grounds must be raised in the bankruptcy court to prevent discharge.
54. See, e.g., Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176 (1904), In re Schlageter, 319 F.2d 821
(3rd Cir. 1963), May v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 292 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1961).
55. Evans v. Lawyer, 123 Ohio St. 62, 68, 173 N.E. 735, 737 (1930). Cf. Helvering v.
New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 464 (1934); Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U.S. 233, 237 (1928).
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statutory remedies to block discharge of the debt for fraud. Its subsequent use of a criminal action to coerce reaffirmation of the discharged debt is arguably a violation of the discharge order injunction.
A creditor's violation of the injunction in a discharge order
amounts at least to technical contempt." Such a creditor would be
subject to citation for contempt in the bankruptcy court upon application of the debtor.57 If a court's injunction does not protect a
discharged debtor from a creditor's criminal action, there are tort
theories the debtor might use to recover for violation of his rights. 8
Those remedies, however, are not really satisfactory alternatives for
a bankrupt. 9
56. In re Kaid, 347 F. Supp. 540, 543 (E.D. Va. 1972).
57. IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY
14.69 at 1454 (14th ed. 1976). Bankruptcy Rule 920
gives a bankruptcy referee contempt power but limits the fine he can impose to not more than
$350. It is likely that the damages Thompson claimed due to the creditor's acts would have
exceeded that amount and required the power of a district court judge.
In re Casper, 338 F. Supp. 327, 331 (E.D. Va. 1972) states that a creditor, acting in
violation of section 14f(2), could be assessed with an attorney's fee occasioned by the difficulties encountered in reopening the bankruptcy case. In re Kaid, however, refused an award of
legal fees when the bankrupt sat on his rights and did not request relief from a state court
prosecution until after judgment was rendered.
58. The plaintiff in Thompson also filed a malicious prosecution suit against the bank,
but the disposition of that suit is not known to the court. Abuse of process and invasion of
privacy are two other theories of action which could arguably be used.
59. In the first place any type of court suit presents the same problem of raising funds
to litigate the action with which the legislative history expresses concern. If the bankrupt
finds an attorney who will take the case on a contingency fee, then his recovery is more
limited.
In the second place the tort theories can present particular problems for debtors. Neither
malicious prosecution nor abuse of process are satisfactory alternatives. Because the courts
do not want to discourage honest men from resorting to the courts, they have always distrusted these actions and retained a stong hand over them. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 119
(4th ed. 1971).
Abuse of process presents other problems. Annot. 27 A.L.R.3d 1202 (1969) (Use of
Criminal Process to Collect Debt as Abuse of Process). Many courts hold that use of criminal
process to collect a debt is not abuse of process unless the defendant does something more
than cause the issuance of process and the plaintiff's arrest. Id. § 5. Consequently, not only
are these actions unpopular with the courts, but the burden of their proof is heavy and may
involve special elements.
Invasion of privacy actions are sometimes used by debtors. Annot. 42 A.L.R.3d 865
(1972) (Threatening, Instituting or Prosecuting Legal Action as Invasion of the Right of
Privacy). The consensus of the cases, though, is that the threat or prosecution of a legal action
as a means of debt collection does not constitute an invasion of privacy, at least in the absence
of oppressive circumstances. Id. § 7. When one accepts credit, he may be held to imply
consent for the creditor to take steps to persuade payment. Consent is found although the
steps taken may result in actual, but not actionable, invasion of the debtor's privacy. Harrison v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 264 F. Supp. 89 (D.S.C. 1967); Annot. 57 A.L.R.3d 16
(1974) (Waiver or Loss of the Right of Privacy).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol3/iss1/10

19781

NOTE

In contrast to Thompson's conclusion on the use of criminal
process as a violation of 14f(2) is that of In re Burke.10 After the
bankrupt, Burke, was discharged, a creditor obtained a state warrant against him charging him with disposing of mortgaged property. The court reasoned that although section 14f(1) makes judgments obtained after discharge null and void, that does not protect
the debtor against harassment by a criminal prosecution aimed at
collection of the debt. "[Tihe bankrupt can be assured of the fresh
start intended by section 14f of the Act only by enjoining the creditor's continued harassment by means of state criminal proceedings.""'
The Bank's Threats of Civil and Criminal Action
The Thompson court decided the terms "action" and "process"
used in the injunction were intended to refer to judicial proceedings.
Because the terms were intended in a technical or legal sense, a
creditor's letters threatening legal action are not prohibited by the
injunction." It supports the court's view that the bill and much of
the legislative history were drafted by lawyers,6 3 who likely employed the terms in their legal usage. So long as the creditor is
enjoined from bringing any kind of action, and the bankrupt knows
that fact, then threats are largely ineffectual and may well fall
outside the evils which Congress sought to remedy.
On the other hand, threats of legal action become sources of
concern when the bankrupt is unaware of, or unable to understand
the injunction, or when the injunction is ineffective against some
kinds of action. In those situations, threats can be coercive and
prevent the bankrupt's fresh start. Threatening to do what one has
been enjoined by a court from doing is conduct of low social utility
and deserves little tolerance. Confining "action" and "process" to
their narrow legal meanings may be correct. That interpretation of
the 14f(2) language does not, however, prevent a court which sees a
need from blocking creditors' use of coercive and harassing letters.
Prior to the grant of injunctive authority in section 14f, some
courts already were enjoining creditor harassment and suits under
60. No. BK-1-75-1760 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 22, 1976), 2 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 66,368.
61. Id.
62. 416 F. Supp. at 996.
63. The bill was a compromise version of separate bills drafted by the National Bankruptcy Conference and the National Conference of Referees in Bankruptcy. For a discussion
of the circumstances, see Countryman, supra note 15, at 21-23.
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authority of Local Loan."4 In that case, the Supreme Court held that
a federal court of equity like a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction of
a bill ancillary to or dependent on an original proceeding in the
same court, when the bill is brought to secure the advantages of a
judgment rendered in the court. That authority should probably
only be exercised under unusual circumstances."
Trouble, embarrassment, expense, and possible loss of employment by the discharged bankrupt were considered enough in some
districts to qualify as unusual circumstances permitting an injunction to protect the discharge. 6 Some broadly drawn injunctions prohibited the creditor "from in any way attempting to collect said
claim . . . or annoying [the debtor] with respect thereto." 7 The
explanatory memorandum in the legislative history specifically
states that the bill "will permit the bankruptcy court to do as a
matter of course what it would otherwise do [under Local Loan]
only where exceptional circumstances exist. 61 8
Even if a court concludes with Thompson that the section
14f(2) injunction is confined to legal proceedings,69 that court has
64. See discussion in note 15 supra and Annot., 141 A.L.R. 1580 (1942) (Grant of
Injunction or Stay by Federal Court to Protect Discharge in Bankruptcy).
65. 292 U.S. at 239.
66. See, e.g., Seaboard Small Loan Corp. v. Ottinger, 50 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1931) in
which a loan company, after the debtor filed for bankruptcy, served a wage assignment on
the bankrupt's employer demanding that 10 percent of his future wages be paid to the
creditor. The court said:
It will not do to say that the bankrupt has an adequate remedy at law by pleading the
discharge in case of suit, or by suing an employer if the latter withholds wages under
an order such as that here. Such remedy is not adequate, because its assertion involves
trouble, embarrassment, expense, and possible loss of employment.
Id. at 859; In re Caldwell, 33 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Ga. 1940) aff'd sub nom. Davison-Paxon
Co. v. Caldwell, 115 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied 313 U.S. 564 (1941), in which a
creditor obtained a state court judgment on a debt discharged without its objection and
served a garnishment based on that judgment on the bankrupt's employer. In granting an
injunction, the court said, "These discharged bankrupts are in many cases induced to renew
such debts or pay them off rather than risk the danger of losing their employment, or of
undergoing the expense, which they can not afford, of defending numerous cases in the State
Courts." Id. at 635.
67. In re Cleapor, 16 F. Supp. 481, 486 (N.D. Ga. 1936). Similar injunctive language
was used in In re Taylor, 29 F. Supp. 656, 657 (N.D. Ga. 1939) and in In re Caldwell, 33 F.
Supp. 631, 635 (N.D. Ga. 1940), aff'd sub nom. Davison-Paxon Co. v. Caldwell, 115 F.2d 189
(5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied 313 U.S. 564 (1941).
68. Explanatory Memorandum to Accompany S. 4247, 116 CONG. REc. 34818, 34819
(October 5, 1970).
69. In another recent interpretation of the injunction, a college's refusal to issue certified copies of college transcripts to students whose student loans had been discharged in
bankruptcy was also found not to be an "action" or "process" in contempt of § 14f(2).
Girardier v. Webster College, 421 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
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the power to issue a broader supplemental injunction under section
2a(15)70 of the Bankruptcy Act. Prior to the 1970 Amendments, In
re Bowen 7' concluded that when the need exists, the power to determine the dischargeability of the debt in question and grant relief is
found in section 2a(15). The creditor in Bowen, after failing to oppose discharge, obtained a default judgment in state court against
the bankrupt and garnisheed his wages. Still not satisfied, he wrote
several harassing letters to the bankrupt's employer. The court
and spirit of
found the creditor's actions subversive of the purpose
2
injunction.
an
granted
and
Act
the Bankruptcy
Accordingly, if a court sees a need to limit harassment and
threats against a debtor, it could -broaden the discharge injunction
under authority of section 2a(15) to directly prohibit offending conduct. Because only the creditor himself needs to be enjoined to make
the order effective, the injunction would not violate the provision at
the end of section 2a(15)."
III.

CONCLUSION

Thompson's Ruling: A Comfort to Creditors?
Operating under authority of Thompson is tenuous. Some other
district courts have determined that criminal actions brought to
coerce payment of a debt violate the 14f(2) injunction or the intent
of the Act.7" A creditor using that method runs a risk of being held
in contempt of a discharge order. If a court feels a creditor's threats
of legal proceedings are interfering with the fresh start for which the
discharge is designed, it has the power to enjoin that conduct.
The result of the case does not accord with the stated purpose
of the 1970 Discharge Amendments to prevent harassment of bankrupts. The Thompson court itself condemned the creditor's threats
70. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(15) (1970):
The courts of the United States hereinbefore defined as courts of bankruptcy. . . are
invested . . . with such jurisdiction . . . in proceedings under this title . . . to...
(15) make such orders, issue such process and enter such judgments, in addition to
those specifically provided for, as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this title; Provided, however, That an injunction to restrain a court may be
issued by the judge only.
71. 222 F. Supp. 97, 100 (N.D. Ga. 1963).
72. Id. at 102.
73. In re Burke, No. BK-1-75-1760 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 22, 1976), 2 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)

66,368.
74. In re Burke, No. BK-1-75-1760 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 22, 1976), 2 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
66,368, discussed in text accompanying notes 60-61 supra; In re Penny, 414 F. Supp. 1113
(W.D.N.C. 1976) discussed in notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
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of action as inexcusable and in obvious disregard of the purpose of
the Bankruptcy Act.7" Nor does the result accord with the increasing
preoccupation of both legislative and decisional law with the protection and relief of debtors."
Use of these methods by creditors, even if they are not technical
violations, will result in outcries for greater protection. Already efforts are being made by two influential sources to remove the impetus for harassment. The Federal Trade Commission staff" and the
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States78 both recommended making debts discharged in bankruptcy no longer
subject to reaffirmation by the bankrupt. That change would make
any new promise to pay worthless to the creditor, and his interest
in coercing such a promise would be removed.
In sum, the decision in Thompson may be only a temporary
source of comfort to those creditors who operate at the margin of the
law.
James DeWeese
75. 416 F. Supp. at 996.
76. See, e.g., Preface to S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEaTORS' PROTECTON
at xii (1967).
77. The Federal Trade Commission's Special Projects Staff recommended in 1974 that
it be made an unfair credit practice for a lender to accept, induce, or seek reaffirmation of a
debt. The recommendation also included barring direct creditor communication with bankrupts in order to insulate bankrupts from pressure. Comment, Reaffirmation of Debts Dischargedin Bankruptcy: An EmpiricalStudy of an Area of PotentialFTC Regulation,8 CONN.
L. REv. 519 (1976).
78. The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States proposed an amendment
to the Bankruptcy Act which provided that most debts "extinguished by discharge ... shall
not be revived or reaffirmed or be all or part of any bargain creating a new debt." A REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 § 4-507(a), at 142 (1973).
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